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Southeast Asia is witnessing major changes to its poli cal, strategic and economic fabric. Some of these, such as 
the rise of China, have been an cipated for some me, while others, such as the US‐China trade dispute, the 
growing prominence of the Indo‐Pacific as a strategic concept, and the Trump administra on’s retreat from 
liberal interna onalism, have unfolded rapidly and disrup vely during the past few years.  
This brief analysis examines the four factors that will shape the security of Southeast Asia in the coming decade 
(1) great power geopoli cs; (2) intra‐regional rela ons and domes c poli cs; (3) non‐tradi onal challnges 
including economic, environmental, demographic and technological issues; and (4) the role of the Associa on of 
Southeast Asian Na ons (ASEAN), including the future of ASEAN centrality.  
In terms of great power geopoli cs, China’s rise dominates the security landscape of Southeast Asia. However, 
concerns that Southeast Asian states will collec vely bandwagon with China have proven to be unfounded. 
China’s Belt and Road Ini a ve (BRI), has encountered resistance, with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand 
maintaining cau ous approaches towards it. Moreover, while China’s economic and military power in the region 
grow, it suffers from a serious so ‐power deficit.  
The Trump administra on has dropped Obama’s “rebalancing” strategy and adopted the “Indo‐Pacific” idea, one 
element of which is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). The Indo‐Pacific approach entailed renaming of 
the US Pacific Command as the US Indo‐Pacific Command and a much more ac ve and frequent program of 
Freedom of Naviga on Opera ons (FONOPS) in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. But this has not led 
to percep ons of a greater US engagement in the region.  
Japan and India have stepped up their engagement with Southeast Asia, partly as a response to China’s increasing 
power and especially owing to concerns about BRI. But while Japan endorses Trump’s Indo‐Pacific strategy, albeit 
with a greater focus on economic engagement, India is more cau ous, not wan ng to turn it into a military front 
against China.  
Overall, despite concerns over the growing US‐China compe on, ASEAN has not abandoned its “co‐
engagement” of both the United States and China. Nor is there any decisive sign of the region choosing sides in 
the US‐China rivalry. This could change if China becomes more asser ve (which would lead more regional 
countries to turn to Washington) or the United States suffers a major decline in its credibility and trustworthiness 
as a strategic partner in the region (which will draw the region into the Chinese orbit).   
A second factor is intra‐regional conflict and domes c poli cal change. Intra‐ASEAN rela ons are strained by 
occasional spikes in bilateral tensions such as in Singapore‐Malaysia rela ons. But intra‐ASEAN disputes remain 
containable. On the other hand, the territorial dispute in the South China Sea remains the main regional conflict 
affec ng security in Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future. Some progress towards diffusing the conflict is in 
sight, especially with the adop on of a Single Dra  South China Sea Code of Conduct Nego a ng Text (SDNT) 
between China and ASEAN. The willingness of China to agree to a code of conduct, which will not resolve the 
dispute but might prevent it from escala ng further, should be seen against the backdrop of China having already 
completed a substan al degree of construc on and militariza on of its occupied islands.  
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Southeast Asia hovers between democracy and authoritarianism. The trend towards greater poli cal 
openness in Malaysia is offset by Cambodia’s slide into deeper authoritarianism, and the impact of a 
populist leader in the Philippines. Democracy in Myanmar and Thailand remain seriously constrained by 
military influence, which could endanger stability there. 
Economic and environmental forces are also shaping the outlook for Southeast Asia in the 2020s. Despite 
the region’s generally good economic fundamentals and the possibility that Southeast Asia may benefit 
from the adjustments to global supply chains triggered by the trade war, the persistence of US‐China 
economic and geopoli cal conflict along with the growing an pathy towards globaliza on in the West 
might damage the region’s economic prospects.  
Southeast Asia is one of the regions of the world most affected by deforesta on and climate change. 
Environmental degrada on caused by deforesta on and commercial plana on farming has been a major 
factor behind the recurring air pollu on (haze) in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Apart from heavy 
economic costs, the haze has caused poli cal tensions among these ASEAN countries.  
Last but not the least, the fate of ASEAN itself is a key variable in Southeast Asia’s security prospects. 
ASEAN remains and is likely to remain key to the regional stability of Southeast Asia. And vital to ASEAN’s 
role is the fate of the concept of “ASEAN centrality”. ASEAN centrality implies that ASEAN should remain at 
the center of the regional architecture, especially mul lateral ins tu ons and dialogues, in the Asia‐Pacific 
or Indo‐Pacific region and that all major powers should respect ASEAN’s role in the “driver’s seat” of 
regional coopera on. But in recent years, this has been challenged. Forging a rela onship with China has 
divided ASEAN, with Cambodia and the Philippines showing greater deference to Beijing in return for aid 
and diploma c cover. And ASEAN has no common stance towards China’s essen ally bilateral Belt and 
Road Ini a ve (BRI). 
Another poten al challenge to “ASEAN centrality” is the Indo‐Pacific concept, originally pushed not by 
ASEAN (except Indonesia individually), but by outside powers such as Australia, Japan, India, and the 
United States. This has led to defensive moves by Indonesia to come up with a more inclusive Indo‐Pacific 
strategy of its own to preserve ASEAN’s principles and posi on. ASEAN has also developed a significant 
degree of coopera on and “community‐building” which will help it with external uncertain es and 
challenges. ASEAN will con nue to develop its three communi es, namely the ASEAN Economic 
Community, the ASEAN Poli cal‐Security Community, and the ASEAN Socio‐Cultural Community, with 
varying degrees of progress. ASEAN does, however, need to make more overall progress in regional 
coopera on to gain the support of the people of the region. 
In the mean me, the sense of an ASEAN iden ty, which is key to long‐term prospects for ASEAN 
community‐building, has grown primarily among elites; the ordinary people of the region are a long way 
from developing a “we feeling” with ASEAN. 
In terms of the future of U.S.‐ASEAN rela ons, an opinion survey by Singapore’s Yusof‐Ishak Ins tute 
shows that 47% of respondents see the United States as an unreliable strategic partner whose 
engagement with the region has declined under the Trump administra on. The good news for the United 
States may be that confidence in Beijing also remains low, even as China is seen as the “most influen al 
strategic and poli cal power” in the region. This should remind US policymakers to take this region 
seriously as a generally friendly area for US interests and do more to support and promote US rela ons 
with regional countries and with ASEAN.  
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